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Abstract
In this note we consider an economic union consisting of sovereign national states.
An asymmetric shock hits the union and as a result it decides to set up a fund in
order to compensate the countries in the union. We show how sacrifice theory can
be used to determine the compensation payments for the countries in a way such
that the relative damages after compensation are equal across countries. Finally, we
apply our results to determine the Covid-19 compensation payments in the EU.
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1 Introduction
According to the EU Commission, the ’Next Generation EU’ program is intended to help
Member States to address the challenges caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. Thus, the
EU Commission wants to compensate losses brought about by Covid-19 and to bring back
the economies to durable growth. The fund comprises 750 billion euro and is generated
by issuing debt on behalf of the EU (see European Commission, 2020).
When allocating the resources across EU Member States, possible criteria could be
the losses in GDP caused by Covid-19 or a combination of the losses in GDP and of the
rise in unemployment, as suggested by Heinemann (2020). There, a simulation has been
performed demonstrating how the funds would be allocated if those criteria were resorted
to. The use of those criteria can be justified by models for fiscal insurance systems that
posit that payments are guided by either fluctuations in growth or by unemployment.
In this note we follow a different approach. We resort to sacrifice theory (see e.g. Lentzi,
2008) to determine the allocation of resources from a joint fund in an economic union that
has been set up in order to compensate the damages caused by an exogenous shock that
hits the economies in an asymmetric manner. Often, sacrifice theories are resorted to in
order to implement the ability-to-pay principle that is used as a justification for income
taxation. A sacrifice is considered as a reduction of utility due to the tax that reduces
disposable income of an individual. Typically, three different concepts are distinguished:
the concept of the same absolute sacrifice, the concept of the same proportional or relative
sacrifice and, finally, the concept of the same marginal sacrifice.
The concept of the same absolute sacrifice requires that each individual makes the
same sacrifice in terms of the same reduction of its utility1 as a result of the tax. This
implies that the decline in utility relative to utility before taxation is smaller the higher
the initial level of utility is, when the marginal utility declines and the reduction in utility
is the same for all in the case of a constant marginal utility, giving a lump-sum tax.
Generally, this is considered as unfair by most societies. Nevertheless, a justification for
1The utility function is assumed to be identical for all individuals, rising in the income and continuously
differentiable with a declining or constant marginal utility.
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that principle can be seen in the argument that each individual in an economy benefits
to the same degree from non-rivalrous public goods provided by the government so that
it is justified to contribute in the same way to its financing. Thus, this principle is based
on the approach of the ’justitia commutativa’ (see Haller, 1973).
The same relative sacrifice is given when the decline in utility, due to income taxation,
relative to utility before taxation is the same for all individuals. With this concept,
individuals with a higher initial level of utility bear a higher reduction of their utility
in absolute values. With a constant marginal utility this leads to a proportional tax
rate, with a declining marginal utility this gives a proportional or progressive tax rate,
depending on the functional form of the utility function. Consequently, individuals with
higher incomes and, thus, higher utility before taxation pay higher taxes compared to
what they would have to pay if the concept of the same absolute sacrifice was applied.
The basis for the same relative sacrifice can be seen in the idea of an ’justitia distributiva’.
The same marginal sacrifice finally implies that the incomes after taxes are identical
for all taxpayers when the marginal utility declines, implying a progressive tax scheme
of the highest degree, while it is indeterminate in the case of a constant marginal utility.
This concept results from the maximization of the sum of individual utilities with respect
to the tax of each individual, i.e. from welfare maximization, and minimizes the total tax
burden. However, its relevance for real world economies is rather limited because it has
severe shortcomings, such as the neglect of incentive problems and the assumption that
the incomes of the individuals are given in the optimization process.
In the rest of this note we proceed as follows. In section 2, we apply the concept of the
same relative sacrifice to determine the allocation of resources to the countries within an
economic union that have been hit differently by an exogenous shock. Section 3 uses the
theoretical results to compute the compensations for the EU 27 where we take preliminary
estimates for the damages caused by Covid-19. Section 4, finally, summarizes our results
and concludes the note.
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2 Theoretical results
We consider an economic union consisting of n sovereign states. An asymmetric shock
hits the economies of the union causing damages Svi , i = 1, . . . , n, in the countries with
Sv =
∑n
i=1 S
v
i . The union sets up a fund with a total amount of Z that is distributed
to the economies where each country receives Zi, i = 1, . . . , n, with Z =
∑n
i=1 Zi. As
regards the allocation of the resources from the fund we posit that the union wants
to avoid any discrimination implying that each economy makes the same sacrifice after
having received its compensation from the fund. In the introduction we have discussed
the three sacrifice concepts. The concept of the absolute sacrifice would imply that the
per capita GDP in each country is reduced by the same amount. This neglects the fact
that richer countries can bear higher loads than poorer economies and would very likely
not be accepted unanimously. A more plausible approach is the concept of the same
proportional sacrifice that has gained broader acceptance.
Therefore, the union decides to allocate the resources from the fund in a way such
that the damages after compensation payments, Si, i = 1, . . . , n, are equal according to
the concept of the same relative sacrifice, i.e.
Y v1 − (Y v1 − S1)
Y v1
=
Y v2 − (Y v2 − S2)
Y v2
= . . . =
Y vn − (Y vn − Sk)
Y vn
holds, with Y vi GDP in country i, i = 1, . . . , n, before the shock. All variables are nominal
and measured in euro and we assume Zi < Svi < Y vi . We should like to point out that
we do not assume a concave utility function giving utility in an economy as a function
of GDP with a declining marginal utility. The use of a strictly concave utility function
may be justified when considering individuals, although it often is disputed even in this
case, but, for entire economies it is not justified to assume a decreasing marginal utility of
GDP. This holds because in each country there exist quite a many poor people who would
benefit from higher incomes and even in rich countries there is a broad scope for public
investment projects that would raise productivity and/or the well-being of the people.
Proposition 1 shows how the sacrifices after compensation are distributed and deter-
mines the allocation of resources when the concept of the same proportional sacrifice is
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applied.
Proposition 1 Assume that the damages after compensation payments should be equal
according to the concept of the same proportional sacrifice and let I = {j ∈ IN|1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
Then, the damages after compensation are given by
Sk = (S
v − Z)
(
Y vk∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)
, k = 1, . . . , n.
Further, compensation payments are determined as
Zk = Z
(
Y vk∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)
+ Svk
(∑
i∈I\{k} Y
v
i∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)
−
(
Y vk∑
i∈I Y
v
i
) ∑
i∈I\{k}
Svi
 , k = 1, . . . , n.
Proof: See appendix A. 2
Proposition 1 shows that the damages in an economy, after compensation, relative to
total damages just equal its GDP before the shock relative to total GDP, i.e. the relative
damage after compensation is equal to its share of GDP in the union before the shock.
Thus, countries with a higher relative share in total GDP bear higher burdens, as was to
be expected.
The compensation payment a country receives is given by the overall amount of the
fund multiplied by its share in total GDP plus its damage before compensation multiplied
by the sum of the GDP of all other economies relative to the total GDP of all economies
minus the damage of all other countries multiplied by the relative GDP share of the
country under consideration. The compensation payment a country receives is not as
intuitive as the sacrifice after compensation it has to make, but, can be easily derived
once its sacrifice has been determined (see the proof in the appendix A).
It can be realized that the payment depends on a component that is independent of
the damages, the total amount of the fund, and on two components that depend on the
shock, the country’s own damage and the damages of all other countries. The payment
is the higher the larger is the fund and the higher is the share of that country’s GDP
relative to the total GDP of all economies. Thus, this first term favors rich countries with
a high GDP. Further, a country receives the more the more it was hit by the shock and
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the lower the damages of all other economies in the union are, ceteris paribus.
3 Application to the ’Next Generation EU’ program
To compute the compensations for the EU 27 countries, we recall the theoretical results
from proposition 1. GDP for 2019 was used as the proxy for GDP before Covid-19
and the data was obtained from the Eurostat website (cf. Eurostat, 2020). Regarding
the damage before Covid-19, we used GDP growth contractions for 2020 and obtained
the data from the European commission spring forecast for April 2020 (see European
Commission, 2020a). Figure 1 and figure 2 provide a pictorial view of the GDP before
Covid-19 and of the damages in terms of GDP losses as a result of Covid-19.2 From Figure
1 it can be seen that the loss is somehow proportional to the level of GDP. However, Italy,
Spain and France experienced a high proportionate loss as compared to the other large
EU economies. From Figure 2, we notice that Greece, Croatia, Hungary and Lithuania
recorded the highest losses in terms of GDP due to Covid-19 in the group of the smaller
EU economies.
Next, we proceed to apply the principle of the same proportional sacrifice to calcu-
late the compensations, the damages after compensation and the relative damages after
compensation for each individual country. As it stands now there has not been a clear
communication as to how the funds would be distributed. However, the discussions sug-
gest that 500bn out of the total 750bn will be distributed as grants whilst the additional
250 will be disbursed in the form of loans. We compute the two equations from proposition
1 considering two scenarios: firstly, we look at the scenario with the total compensation
amount of 750bn spent according to the same relative sacrifice and, then, we consider
the situation with a compensation of 500bn distributed according to that principle. We
do so because, on the one hand, one can argue that the payments are to compensate for
the Covid-19 damages, independent of how they are financed. In this respect, one would
adopt a purely static view. On the other hand, one could argue that 250bn have to be
paid back by the recipient countries in the future so that they have to cover that part of
2The figure was split into two parts, large EU economies and small EU economies. This is to avoid scaling
problems due to the high GDP of some countries relative to others.
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the damage by themselves, implying that it does not reduce losses.
Figure 1: EU GDP 2019 and damages due to Covid-19 (large EU economies)
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Figure 2: EU GDP 2019 and damages due to Covid-19 (small EU economies)
Table 1 presents the computation of the compensation payments using the concept of
the same proportional sacrifice with the results from proposition 1. Recall that Y vi denotes
the GDP before the Covid-19 shock, Svi is the damage to GDP caused by Covid-19, Zi
represents the compensation payment according to the same relative sacrifice principle, Si
gives damages after compensation and Si/Y vi is the relative damage after compensation.
In the table 1 we report losses, Li = −Si, in order to point out that these reduce the GDP
in the economies under consideration. The compensation payments have been calculated
such that all countries bear the same relative burden or damages according to the concept
of the same proportional sacrifice. This is can be seen from table 1 (column 4 and column
6) considering total compensation package of 750bn and 500bn, respectively. Further,
in both instances the relative damages after compensation are equal for all countries as
can be seen from columns 5 and 7 in table 1. Hence, the concept of equal proportional
sacrifice is fulfilled.
Table 2 provides an overview of our proposed compensation allocation relative to
the GDP before Covid-19. In other words, we computed the ratio of the compensation
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Table 1: Compensations and losses before (Lvi = −Svi ) and after (Li = −Si) compensation.
Countries Y vi Lvi /Y vi Z=750bn Z=500bn
Zi Li/Y
v
i Zi Li/Y
v
i
Belgium 473.09 -0.072 24.37 -0.02 15.88 -0.04
Germany 3,435.21 -0.065 152.93 -0.02 91.28 -0.04
Estonia 28.04 -0.069 1.36 -0.02 0.86 -0.04
Ireland 347.22 -0.079 20.32 -0.02 14.09 -0.04
Greece 187.46 -0.097 14.34 -0.02 10.98 -0.04
Spain 1,245.33 -0.094 91.56 -0.02 69.20 -0.04
France 2,425.71 -0.082 149.23 -0.02 105.69 -0.04
Italy 1,787.66 -0.095 133.22 -0.02 101.13 -0.04
Cyprus 21.94 -0.074 1.17 -0.02 0.78 -0.04
Latvia 30.48 -0.070 1.51 -0.02 0.96 -0.04
Lithuania 48.43 -0.079 2.83 -0.02 1.96 -0.04
Luxembourg 63.52 -0.054 2.13 -0.02 0.99 -0.04
Malta 13.28 -0.058 0.50 -0.02 0.26 -0.04
Netherlands 812.05 -0.068 38.59 -0.02 24.01 -0.04
Austria 398.68 -0.055 13.76 -0.02 6.61 -0.04
Portugal 212.32 -0.068 10.09 -0.02 6.28 -0.04
Slovenia 48.01 -0.07 2.38 -0.02 1.52 -0.04
Slovakia 94.17 -0.067 4.38 -0.02 2.69 -0.04
Finland 240.08 -0.063 10.21 -0.02 5.90 -0.04
Bulgaria 60.68 -0.072 3.13 -0.02 2.04 -0.04
Czechia 220.20 -0.062 9.14 -0.02 5.19 -0.04
Denmark 310.94 -0.059 11.98 -0.02 6.40 -0.04
Croatia 53.94 -0.091 3.80 -0.02 2.84 -0.04
Hungary 143.83 -0.070 7.12 -0.02 4.54 -0.04
Poland 529.03 -0.043 11.91 -0.02 2.42 -0.04
Romania 223.34 -0.060 8.83 -0.02 4.82 -0.04
Sweden 474.15 -0.061 19.21 -0.02 10.70 -0.04
Computation of the losses Lk = −Sk = (Z − Sv)
(
Y vk∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)
, k = 1, . . . , n. and of the compensations
Zk = Z
(
Y vk∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)
+ Svk
(∑
i∈I\{k} Y
v
i∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)
−
(
Y vk∑
i∈I Y
v
i
)(∑
i∈I\{k} S
v
i
)
, k = 1, . . . , n. GDP and compensa-
tions are expressed in billion of euros.
payments of individual countries to the GDP before Covid-19. It can be observed that
countries with higher GDP losses, such as Spain, Italy, Greece and France with a loss
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above 8%, receive compensations of more than 7% relative to their GDP in 2019. This
is higher than the compensations for countries such as Denmark, Malta, Poland and
Austria who experienced damages (losses) less than 6% of their GDP. Figure 3 gives a
further graphical overview of the damages and of the compensations both as a percentage
of GDP in 2019. It can be observed that the compensation payments for all individual
countries relative to GDP in 2019 amounts to more than half of the damages relative to
GDP in 2019. In the end the relative loss (damage) after the compensation package is the
same for all countries. We can infer that this principle is therefore not discriminatory in
the sense that all countries bear the same relative burden after the compensation package.
Indeed, as opined by Neil (2000), the equal sacrifice principle can be considered as a formal
characterization of fairness and as a fundamental concept of distributive justice.
Figure 3: Damage due to Covid-19 and compensation (as percentage of GDP 2019)
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Table 2: Compensation payments as percentage of GDP 2019
Countries Z=750bn Z=500bn
Zi Zi(%GDP) Zi Zi(%GDP)
Belgium 24.37 5.2% 15.88 3.4%
Germany 152.93 4.5% 91.28 2.7%
Estonia 1.36 4.9% 0.86 3.1%
Ireland 20.32 5.9% 14.09 4.1%
Greece 14.34 7.7% 10.98 5.9%
Spain 91.56 7.4% 69.20 5.6%
France 149.23 6.2% 105.69 4.4%
Italy 133.22 7.5% 101.13 5.7%
Cyprus 1.17 5.4% 0.78 3.6%
Latvia 1.51 5.0% 0.96 3.2%
Lithuania 2.83 5.9% 1.96 4.1%
Luxembourg 2.13 3.4% 0.99 1.6%
Malta 0.50 3.8% 0.26 2.0%
Netherlands 38.59 4.8% 24.01 3.0%
Austria 13.76 3.5% 6.61 1.7%
Portugal 10.09 4.8% 6.28 3.0%
Slovenia 2.38 5.0% 1.52 3.2%
Slovakia 4.38 4.7% 2.69 2.9%
Finland 10.21 4.3% 5.90 2.5%
Bulgaria 3.13 5.2% 2.04 3.4%
Czechia 9.14 4.2% 5.19 2.4%
Denmark 11.98 3.9% 6.40 2.1%
Croatia 3.80 7.1% 2.84 5.3%
Hungary 7.12 5.0% 4.54 3.2%
Poland 11.91 2.3% 2.42 0.5%
Romania 8.83 4.0% 4.82 2.2%
Sweden 19.21 4.1% 10.70 2.3%
4 Conclusion
In this note we have used the concept of the same proportional sacrifice to determine the
compensation payments to countries of an economic union that is hit by an asymmetric
shock such that each country has to make the same relative sacrifice after compensation.
10
We have derived that the damage in each country, after the compensation, relative to the
sum of damages equals the share of the country’s GDP relative to the sum of the GDP
of all economies. Then, we derived the compensation payment in a country and found
that it equals the weighted difference of the total fund minus the weighted damages of
all other countries plus that country’s weighted damage. Finally, we applied our results
to the allocation of resources from the ’Next Generation EU’ program and computed
the compensation each Member States receives, based on preliminary estimates as to the
damages caused by Covid-19.
To finish our note we want to point out two aspects that we did not take into account.
Firstly, when computing the compensations we did not allow for differences in the price
level of the countries. Thus, one euro transferred to Lithuania disposes of a different
purchasing power than one euro transferred to Luxembourg, for example. That problem,
however, could be easily solved by integrating a price deflator and using real values.
Nevertheless, the basic results would still remain the same.
Secondly, when computing the compensations we neglected the fact that the economic
capacity of a country does not only depend on its GDP, but on its private and public
wealth as well. Hence, in future works one could allow for that aspect by referring the
damages to an aggregate of GDP and wealth that is to reflect the economic capacity of a
country more accurately.
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A Proof of proposition 1
The concept of the same relative sacrifice implies
S1
Y v1
=
S2
Y v2
= . . . =
Sk
Y vn
Setting S1/Y v1 = S2/Y v2 and using S1 = S −
∑n
i=2 Si leads to
S2 = S
(
Y v2
Y v1 + Y
v
2
)
−
n∑
i=3
Si
(
Y v2
Y v1 + Y
v
2
)
, (A.1)
where S =
∑n
i=1 Si. Inserting S2 from (A.1) in S2/Y
v
2 = S3/Y
v
3 gives
S3 = S
(
Y v3
Y v1 + Y
v
2 + Y
v
3
)
−
n∑
i=4
Si
(
Y v3
Y v1 + Y
v
2 + Y
v
3
)
Continuing this procedure, we obtain
Sn−1 = S
(
Y vn−1∑n−1
i=1 Y
v
i
)
− Sn
(
Y vn−1∑n−1
i=1 Y
v
i
)
(A.2)
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Inserting Sn−1 from (A.2) in Sn−1/Y vn−1 = Sn/Y vn and solving with respect to Sn, finally,
leads to
Sn = S
(
Y vn∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
(A.3)
Inserting Sn from (A.3) in (A.2) gives
Sn−1 = S
(
Y vn−1∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
(A.4)
and so on up to S1. Noting that S = Sv − Z leads to Sk in proposition 1.
To compute compensation payments Zk, we note that Zk = Svk−Sk holds. Computing
Zn using (A.3) and S = Sv − Z, we obtain for country n
Zn = S
v
n − Svn
(
Y vn∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
−
n−1∑
i=1
Svi
(
Y vn∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
+ Z
(
Y vn∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
= Svn
(∑n−1
i=1 Y
v
i∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
−
n−1∑
i=1
Svi
(
Y vn∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
+ Z
(
Y vn∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
Proceeding in the same way to compute Zn−1 generates
Zn−1 = S
v
n−1
(∑n
i=1 Y
v
i − Y vn−1∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
−
(
n∑
i=1
Svi − Svn−1
)(
Y vn−1∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
+ Z
(
Y vn−1∑n
i=1 Y
v
i
)
Continuing this procedure up to Z1 demonstrates that Zk is given by the expression in
proposition 1. 2
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